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Introduction
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that state ballot initiatives’ official proponents lack standing
to defend their enacted initiative in federal courts. This ruling has
prompted a broad concern among initiative proponents and other
supporters: if proponents lack standing and if state officials — who
do have standing — refuse to defend initiatives, then some initiatives
may go undefended. Two separate initiatives, Propositions 54 and 60,
appeared on California’s November 8, 2016, ballot. They attempted
to dodge Hollingsworth in different ways.
Proposition 60, which failed to pass, would have regulated
the adult film industry by, inter alia, mandating condom use in films
produced in California.2 Proposition 60’s first standing provision
specified that the proponent is to pay a $10,000 penalty if Proposition
60 is invalidated by a court.3 The prospect of this penalty, the
proponent would argue, poses a particularized and concrete injury to
him.4 Proposition 60’s second standing provision specified that the
state shall employ the proponent and grant him or her the authority
to defend the initiative if the state’s attorney general fails to defend
the initiative.5
Proposition 54, which did pass, was an initiative with
constitutional and statutory provisions. It will reform state legislative
procedures by, inter alia, mandating that any bill be posted on the
Internet at least seventy-two hours before the legislature approves
it.6 One of Proposition 54’s provisions eschews the need for actual
1
2

3
4
5
6

133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
Proposition 60: California Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act, in Cal. Sec’y of
State, Official Voter Information Guide 148-54 (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop60
[hereinafter Proposition 60]. California’s voters rejected Proposition 60; it received
only 46.3 percent of the popular vote. Statement of Vote Summary Pages, Cal. Sec’y
of State 12 (2016), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/06sov-summary.pdf.
Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7.
See discussion infra Part II-A.
Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 10.
Proposition 54: the California Legislature Transparency Act, in Cal. Sec’y of State,
Official Voter Information Guide 125-28 (Aug. 15, 2016), http://
vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop54
[hereinafter Proposition 54]. California’s voters approved Proposition 54; it
received over 65 percent of the popular vote. See http://elections.cdn.sos.
ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/06-sov-summary.pdf.
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standing; instead, it mandates that the California Attorney General file
a notice of appeal from any judgment that Proposition 54 is invalid.7
After such a notice is filed, Proposition 54’s proponents — and,
perhaps, other interested parties — may participate as intervenors
or as amici, even if they lack actual standing as appellants.8
This Article considers whether, notwithstanding Hollingsworth, one or more of these various provisions — or scholars’
variations on them or their future progeny — would confer standing
on or otherwise allow participation by initiative proponents in
California and elsewhere. Part I reviews Hollingsworth and its
aftermath against the backdrop of California’s initiative process
and the Supreme Court’s doctrine of standing under Article III of
the Constitution. Part II assesses the principal rationales available
for sustaining standing under the types of provisions contained in
Proposition 60 or under other variations designed to give proponents
a sufficiently distinct stake in the outcome of legal challenges
to establish standing. Part III assesses whether Proposition 54’s
requirement that the Attorney General file a notice of appeal allows
proponents to defend the initiative even in the absence of standing.
The Article concludes that none of Proposition 60’s justifications
avoid the obstacles to standing created by Hollingsworth and the
Court’s wider standing doctrine. Thus, it appears that proponents
of initiatives in California and other states with similar initiative
provisions must devise other means of securing a place in court when
state officials decline to defend their (the proponents’) initiative.
One of those other means may be similar to Proposition 54, which
may allow proponents some rights to participate, even if those rights
are limited.
I.

The Impact of Hollingsworth on the Law of Standing

The Supreme Court has construed Article III of the United
States Constitution to impose requirements for standing that
can operate as stringent barriers to access to federal courts. In
Hollingsworth, failure to meet these criteria defeated the efforts of
proponents of Proposition 8 — an initiative to bar recognition of
same-sex marriage in California — to serve as its legal defenders.
The ruling has evoked strategies for conferring standing on initiative
7
8

Proposition 54, supra note 6, §§ 6.1(c), 6.1(d).
See discussion infra Part III.

72

John S. Caragozian and Nat Stern

proponents through state law, lest state officials effectively cause
disfavored initiatives to fall for lack of defense.
A. The Requisites of Standing Under Article III
“Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts
the power to decide legal questions only in the presence of an
actual ‘Cas[e]’ or ‘Controvers[y].’ This restriction requires a party
invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction to demonstrate standing.”9
While a comprehensive discussion of standing is beyond the scope
of this Article,10 its essential elements can be briefly stated. First,
a party must show that he or she has suffered a cognizable “injury
in fact.”11 Second, that injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the
government action to which the party objects.12 Third, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the likelihood that the relief sought will redress

9

10

11
12

Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). See also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997)
(“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system
of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction
to actual cases or controversies.” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976))). Most of the case law and commentary focuses on
standing requirements for plaintiffs. E.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1547-48 (2016) (citing to, inter alia, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975)). However, defendants also are
required to have standing, including a direct stake in the litigation’s outcome.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217 (2011) (“One who seeks to
initiate or continue proceedings in federal court must demonstrate, among
other requirements, both standing to obtain the relief requested, and, in
addition, an ‘ongoing interest in the dispute’ on the part of the opposing party
that is sufficient to establish ‘concrete adverseness.’” (citations omitted));
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011) (stating that both parties must
maintain stake in outcome throughout litigation). See generally Matthew I.
Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 Fordham L.
Rev. 1539, 1550-57 (2012).
For an overview of Article III standing, see Ronald D. Rotunda & John
E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law §2.13(f) (5th ed. 2012);
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221 (1998); and
Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a
Comeback? Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 213, 218-27 (2015).
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976).
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the injury.13 As these criteria suggest, parties have the burden of
proving their standing to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction.14
Further, several additional features of standing doctrine are
especially pertinent to the question of defending initiatives. First,
federal law generally controls whether parties have standing in
federal courts.15 Second, the requisite injury must be “concrete and
particularized.”16 Particularization means that the injury affects the
plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.”17 To qualify as concrete,
an injury may be “intangible”18 or even “threatened” (as opposed
to “actual”),19 but it cannot be a “generalized grievance,” no matter
how sincerely held.20 Third, a state always has standing to defend the
13

14
15

16

17
18
19
20

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 12829 (1983) (requiring plaintiff to show that “the injuries he has alleged can
be remedied or prevented by some form of judicial relief ”). The Court has
sometimes cast standing requirements in additional ways. See, e.g., Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (standing requires “a logical nexus between
the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated”). The Court
has announced, however, that injury in fact, traceability, and redressability
constitute the essential components of standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
See Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2342; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013). However, this general
rule is subject to exception. For example, federal courts may look to state law
as to who has standing to represent a corporation organized under the state’s
laws or who has standing as a guardian to represent a minor child. See Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-78 (2004); Sanderling
v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 743, 750, 751 (1976). See also Karl Manheim, John S.
Caragozian, & Donald Warner, Fixing Hollingsworth: Standing in Initiative
Cases, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1069, 1105-06 & nn.196-200 (2015). See generally
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2) & 17(b)(3). Also, as set forth in Section III-B-2
infra, federal courts look to state law regarding an initiative’s severability (i.e.,
whether one invalid provision in an initiative invalidates the whole initiative
or whether the invalid provision can be severed, with the remainder of the
initiative surviving).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Accord Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341-42
(2014); see Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (denying standing
where plaintiffs “assert[ed] no particularized stake in the litigation”); Warth,
422 U.S. at 501 (requiring allegation that injury to plaintiff is “distinct and
palpable”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 756 (1984); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 740–741, n. 16 (1972).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted); Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464,
472-73 (1982).
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
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validity of its own laws.21 More generally, federal courts may accord
states “special solicitude” in connection with standing.22 However,
a state’s representative in federal litigation must be a state official,
such as the attorney general; under Article III, “private parties” are
ineligible to represent a state.23
B. Proposition 8 and Hollingsworth v. Perry
Most states, including California, allow voters to enact
state laws through a ballot initiative.24 In California, an initiative
is proposed by one or more registered voters who are formally
designated as “proponents.”25 California initiative proponents’
responsibilities include drafting the initiative, submitting it to the
State Attorney General (for administrative processing), gathering
and submitting the requisite signatures to place the initiative on a
statewide ballot, and authorizing ballot arguments in the initiative’s
favor.26 Following this procedure, in 2008, State Senator Dennis
21
22

23
24

25
26

E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.
54, 65 (1986); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 601 (1982).
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 154 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, United
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (explaining that states “are not normal litigants for the
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction”).
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664, 2668.
Twenty-six states allow voters to enact statutory or constitutional additions
or changes by direct initiative (where voters bypass the legislature entirely,
such as in California) or indirect initiative (where the legislature has a first
opportunity to adopt the proposed initiative, but, if the legislature rejects it,
then it goes to the voters). See Initiative and Referendum States, Nat’l Conf.
of State Legis. (Dec. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx.
E.g., Cal. Elec. Code §§ 9001, 9002, 9032 (Deering 2016).
See generally Cal. Elec. Code §§ 9001-9065 (Deering 2016). See also
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662. The signature requirement is particularly
onerous: a statutory initiative requires signatures numbering five percent
of the total votes cast for all gubernatorial candidates in the most recent
election, and a constitutional initiative requires eight percent. Cal. Const.,
art. II, § 8(b). In 2014, approximately 7.32 million votes were cast for all
California gubernatorial candidates, meaning that slightly more than 585,000
valid signatures now are required for a constitutional initiative and almost
366,000 for a statutory initiative. See Statement of Vote, Cal. Sec’y of
State 6 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/
pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf (the California Secretary of State’s “Statement of
Vote” for the November 4, 2014 general election, which is California’s most
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Hollingsworth — acting as a private citizen — and four other private
citizens proposed a California constitutional initiative to bar legal
recognition of same-sex marriage.27 Known as Proposition 8, the
measure was approved by California’s voters in 2008.28
In 2009, two same-sex couples challenged Proposition 8’s
constitutionality in the United States District Court.29 However,
neither California’s Governor nor Attorney General actively
defended Proposition 8.30 Thereafter, Senator Hollingsworth and
the other official proponents successfully intervened as defendants
in the District Court.31 After trial, in which the proponents actively
participated, the District Court ruled Proposition 8 unconstitutional
on due process and equal protection grounds.32
Neither the Governor nor Attorney General appealed the
District Court’s judgment, but Proposition 8’s official proponents
did. When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals questioned whether
the official proponents had standing to appeal, the proponents
responded that they had an individualized interest in defending
Proposition 8 and had “an alternative and independent additional
basis for standing,” namely, the ability to assert the State’s interest
in defending Proposition 8.33 The Ninth Circuit then certified the
standing question to the California Supreme Court: Under California
law, do official proponents “possess either [1] a particularized interest
in the initiative’s validity or [2] the authority to assert the State’s
interest in the initiative’s validity . . . ?”34 For ease of reference, this
Article refers to “prong 1” of this inquiry as whether the proponent

27
28
29

30
31
32
33
34

recent gubernatorial election). With signature gatherers charging $3 to $5 or
more per signature, millions of dollars are typically required just to gather
signatures. See, e.g., John S. Caragozian, From Crisis to Solution—California’s
Problems in Two Books: A Review of Remaking California and California Crackup,
44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 687, 695 & nn.50-51 (2011); Petition People Gather Big
Bucks, L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 2016, at B1, col. 1.
For a more detailed account of the passage of Proposition 8 and the litigation
that followed, see Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1077-88.
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Complaint
for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-2292), https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/
cand/09cv2292/files/1-1.pdf.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
Id.
Id. at 995-1003.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1193.
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has standing on his or her own personal behalf and “prong 2” as
whether the proponent may assume the State’s standing.
The California Supreme Court unanimously answered “yes”
to the Ninth Circuit’s prong 2, accepting the proponents’ assertion
of a representative interest, but expressly declined to answer prong
1 regarding personal standing.35 The Ninth Circuit accepted the
California Supreme Court’s answer and accordingly held that the
official proponents had standing to represent the State in defending
Proposition 8.36 On the merits, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the District Court’s judgment of Proposition 8’s unconstitutionality.37
The official proponents then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, where a five-to-four majority ruled that the
official proponents lacked standing.38 The Court first held that
the proponents lacked personal standing — prong 1 of the Ninth
Circuit’s certified question to the California Supreme Court on
which the California Supreme Court declined to rule.39 According to
the Hollingsworth majority, once voters approved the initiative, the
official proponents lost any unique role in the process.40 Instead, the
proponents had only a general interest in the initiative, an interest
shared by all other state citizens.41 This generalized interest, in turn,
was insufficient to confer personal standing on the proponents.42
As for the Ninth Circuit’s prong 2 — where the California
Supreme Court had answered that the official proponents possessed
standing to assert the State’s interest43 — the Hollingsworth majority
rejected the California Supreme Court’s opinion, concluding instead
that the proponents were not proper agents of the State.44 As a
threshold matter, Hollingsworth noted that the proponents were not
elected officials.45 Moreover, the proponents lacked “the most basic
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44
45

Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1015, 1033 (Cal. 2011).
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
671 F.3d at 1064.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
Id. at 2662-63.
Id. at 2663.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (stating that after voters
approve an initiative, the proponents “have no role” in its enforcement and,
apparently, are nothing more than “concerned bystanders,” despite their being
“deeply committed” or “zealous”).
Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011).
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
Id. at 2668 (“We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to
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features of an agency relationship.”46 For example, the proponents
had no fiduciary obligations to the State and were not subject to
the State’s control.47 Further, the majority opinion criticized a
policy of granting proponents standing to represent a state, noting
that proponents would be “free to pursue a purely ideological
commitment to the [initiative’s] constitutionality without the
need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public
opinion, or potential ramifications for other state priorities.”48 Given
the absence of Hollingsworth appellants — the official proponents
lacked standing and the State officials (who had standing) refused
to appeal49 — the Court held that no “case or controversy” existed
under Article III.50 Accordingly, the Court found a lack of jurisdiction
and ordered that the Ninth Circuit vacate its judgment and dismiss
the appeal, finalizing the District Court’s judgment of Proposition
8’s unconstitutionality.51
Therefore, Hollingsworth holds that, under Article III, official
proponents generally lack standing to defend “their” approved
initiatives.52 More particularly, proponents qua proponents have

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen
not to. We decline to do so for the first time here.”). See also id. at 2666-67.
Id. at 2666.
Id. at 2666-67.
Id. at 2667.
Id. at 2660, 2666-67.
Id.
Id. at 2668. In 2015 — two years after Hollingsworth — the Supreme Court
reached the merits of same-sex marriage bans, holding them unconstitutional.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
This general rule is subject to some exceptions. For example, in federal court:
A.
Initiative proponents probably have standing to defend their initiatives
from challenges before the initiatives are approved by voters. See, e.g.,
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (ruling that proponents lost their
special role “once Proposition 8 was approved by the voters”).
B.
In the Ninth Circuit, parties without standing (presumably including
initiative proponents) may have “piggyback” standing: they may
intervene as defendants if parties with standing (such as state officials)
are also defending the lawsuit. See, e.g., State of Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 845-46 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2003). However,
other circuits — including the D. C., Seventh, and Eighth Circuits —
disallow such piggyback standing. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in
Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78 Wash. U.L.Q. 215,
270 (2000).
C.
Again, in the Ninth Circuit, initiative proponents may defend
their initiative during an appeal if they are appellees (though not as
appellants). See, e.g., Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 573
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neither personal standing (prong 1) nor a right to represent the State
(prong 2). This lack of standing, in turn, may well be dispositive in
suits challenging popular initiatives when the state itself refuses to
defend. After all, under our adversary system, courts are more likely
to invalidate an undefended initiative.
C. Hollingsworth’s Aftermath
Various scholars and others have criticized Hollingsworth for
giving state officials a practical veto over voter-approved initiatives.53
Without a defense, Proposition 8 was — and, critics fear, other state
initiatives will be — invalidated by federal courts.54
Attempts by recent initiative proponents to avoid Hollingsworth
involve drafting initiative language appointing themselves “as agents
of the people and the State” with authority to defend the initiative
“in any legal proceeding.”55 This attempt to obtain representational
standing is likely to fail for at least two reasons. First, under the
California Constitution, “no statute proposed to the electors . . .
by initiative, that names any individual to hold any office . . . may
(9th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014).
With regard to some initiatives, proponents who would benefit from
them — say, by lowered taxes — would have personal standing to
defend such initiatives at trial and on appeal, though without reference
to their status as proponents. See generally Manheim et al., supra note 15,
at 1121-22, 1125-27 & n.286.
		 Likewise, in state court, depending on state law, proponents may have
authority to represent the state, thereby having standing to defend their
initiatives at trial and on appeal. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Nor do
we question . . . the right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in
California courts, where Article III does not apply.”); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d
1002, 1016-20 (Cal. 2001). See also Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1121.
53 See, e.g., Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, Standing at a Constitutional Divide:
Redefining State and Federal Requirements for Initiatives after Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229, 280-83 (2014); Manheim et al., supra
note 15, at 1072 & n.3, 1120-21.
54 See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 53, at 242-43.
55 See Jamie Court, Request for Title and Summary for Proposed Online Privacy Act, No.
14-0007, Initiative Coordinator, Cal. Att’y Gen. Office §§ 5(a),
5(b)(1) (Jan. 16, 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/140007%20%2814-0007%20%28Online%20Privacy%20V2%29%29.pdf?.
Implicit in such efforts is the proposition — also implicit in Hollingsworth —
that a defendant must have proper standing in order to appear as a formal
party in a legal proceeding. The Court has indicated this principle expressly
elsewhere. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217 (2011); Camreta v.
Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011). See generally, Hall, supra note 9.
D.
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be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”56 Second, under
federal law, a bare designation of an initiative’s proponent as a
state’s agent — without fiduciary obligations and without the policy
responsibilities of resource constraints and other state priorities —
is unlikely to satisfy Hollingsworth.57
Other recent initiatives specify that special counsel must be
appointed to defend the initiative.58 This solution probably passes
Hollingsworth muster.59 Still, some proponents may resist it, because
the special counsel — and not the proponents — would control the
initiative’s defense.
II. Seeking to Avoid Hollingsworth: Embedding Standing in the
Initiative Itself
The solutions discussed above in Part I-C — the rights of
proponents or special counsel to represent the state and thus acquire
the state’s standing to defend its own laws — are based on prong 2
of the Ninth Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s decisions. A different
approach, namely an attempt to create personal standing under
prong 1, was illustrated by Proposition 60, the statutory initiative,
which appeared — but did not pass — on the November 8, 2016,
California ballot.60 While Proposition 60 was a California initiative,
the standing issues that it exemplifies apply broadly to all states with
initiatives.61 Furthermore, as discussed in Part II-B below, scholars
have suggested variations on Proposition 60’s penalty, and those
56
57
58

59

60
61

Cal. Const. art. II, § 12. Other states have this same prohibition. See note
115 infra. The prohibition is further discussed at notes 114-17 infra and
accompanying text.
See Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1141.
See, e.g., High Quality Teachers Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 13-0062, § 14(a)
(Cal. 2013), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/13-0062%20
(13-0062%20(Teachers%20V2)).pdf; No Blank Checks Initiative, Pub. L. No.
14-0009 (Cal. 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/140009%20(14-0009%20(Bond-funded%20Projects)).pdf. See also Manheim et
al., supra note 15, at 1140.
In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld the
right of special prosecutors to represent the United States. The Hollingsworth
Court reaffirmed Morrison’s holding. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652, 2665 (2013). For additional analysis and detail (including proposed
model language) regarding the appointment of special counsel to defend
initiatives, see Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1137-38, 1140.
Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7.
Id.
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variations also apply beyond California.
Proposition 60 — to regulate the adult film industry in
California — was proposed by a single individual and received the
requisite number of signatures to qualify for the statewide ballot.62
Proposition 60 included two provisions relevant to this new standing
approach:
Section 7. Proponent Accountability.
The People of the State of California hereby
declare that the proponent of [Proposition 60]
should be held civilly liable in the event [Proposition
60] is struck down, after passage, by a court for
being constitutionally or statutorily impermissible.
Such a[n] . . . impermissible initiative is a misuse
of taxpayer funds and electoral resources and
[Proposition 60]’s proponent, as the drafter . . . must
be held accountable . . . .
In the event [Proposition 60], after
passage, is struck down . . . in whole or in part, as
unconstitutional or statutorily invalid, and all avenues
for appealing and overturning the court decision
have been exhausted, the proponent shall pay a civil
penalty of $10,000 to the . . . State of California for
failure to draft a wholly constitutionally or statutorily
permissible initiative . . . . No party of entity may
waive this civil penalty.63
....
Section 9. Severability.
If any provision of [Proposition 60], or part
thereof, . . . is for any reason held to be invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions and parts
62

63

Michael Weinstein, Request for Title and Summary for Proposed California Safer
Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act, No. 15-0004, Initiative Coordinator,
Cal. Att’y Gen. Office (Feb. 12, 2015), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/
initiatives/pdfs/15-0004%20%28Safer%20Sex%29_8.pdf?.
Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7.
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shall not be affected, but shall remain in full force
and effect, and to this end the provisions and parts
of [Proposition 60] are severable. The voters hereby
declare that [Proposition 60], and each portion and
part, would have been adopted irrespective of whether
any one or more provisions or parts are found to be
invalid or unconstitutional.64
Proposition 60’s Section 10 also dealt with standing, but
unlike Section 7, it was designed to achieve standing via prong 2.65
Section 10 would appoint the proponent as a state employee if “the
Attorney General fails to defend [Proposition 60] . . . or fails to appeal
an adverse judgment . . . .”66 Upon the proponent’s appointment, he
would be: removable only for “good cause” as voted by “each house
of the Legislature”; required to take same the oath of office that all
state employees take, subject to “all fiduciary . . . duties prescribed
by law”; and allowed to defend Proposition 60.67 The state would be
required to pay for the proponent’s “reasonable expenses and other
losses incurred . . . in defending . . . [Proposition 60].”68 Under
Section 10, and upon the Attorney General’s failure to defend, the
proponent would become a salaried state employee and would be
entitled to engage outside counsel — at the State’s expense — to
appear on behalf of the State in defending the initiative.69

64
65
66
67
68

69

Id. § 9.
Id. § 10.
Id.
Id.
Proposition 60’s proponent had reason to apprehend that California officials
might refuse to defend Proposition 60. The same proponent proposed a similar
initiative to regulate the adult film industry in Los Angeles County. That
initiative, titled Measure B, was approved by Los Angeles County’s voters in
2012, but no county officials actively defended it when its constitutionality
was challenged in federal court. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d
1113, 1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2013), aff ’d, 774 F.3d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 2014). See also
Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1123-27 & nn.281, 286 & 299-300. Instead,
the county officials filed an answer that the complaint “presents important
constitutional questions that require and warrant judicial determination,”
but the officials otherwise took “a position of neutrality regarding whether
Measure B is constitutional . . . .” Vivid Entm’t. v Fielding, No. 13-00190,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54060, at *12 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). See also
Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1123 & n.281.
Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 10.
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A. Creating an Individual Stake in the Validity of Proposition
60: Injury in the Form of Penalty

Proposition 60’s Section 7 raises a fundamental question of
standing to defend initiatives: Does a prospective penalty of this nature
give the proponent a concrete interest in the initiative sufficient to
confer standing to defend it? The answer is far from certain.
In the event that an initiative with this language were
approved by voters and challenged in court, the proponent would
argue that he has a concrete interest in defending it because he
personally faces a monetary penalty if the initiative is invalidated.
This interest is not a general one shared by other state citizens.
Accordingly, the proponent, as an individual, also has prong 1’s
particularized standing.
A plaintiff challenging the initiative might object to the
proponent’s prong 1 standing argument on at least three independent
grounds. First, the proponent would not have the fiduciary
obligations and would not meet the policy criteria — such as the
resource constraints with which state officials contend — required
by Hollingsworth. Second, the prospect of the monetary penalty may
be insufficiently concrete to serve as a basis for standing. Third, even
if the penalty is concrete, a court might conclude that, as a selfinflicted injury, it cannot serve as a basis for standing. Each of these
objections is discussed below.
1.

Absence of Fiduciary Obligations

One of Hollingsworth’s rationales for denying standing to
initiative proponents was that proponents lack fiduciary obligations
and therefore — unlike state officials — need not account for a
state’s resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or potential
ramifications for other state priorities.70 This rationale, in turn,
might be used by a plaintiff to object to a proponent’s standing,
because the monetary penalty does not imbue the proponent with
a state official’s fiduciary obligations or a state official’s resource
constraints and other policy considerations.
On the other hand, Hollingsworth’s policy rationale here was
aimed at prong 2: whether a proponent could represent the state
and thereby assume the state’s standing. An individual’s standing
70

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct 2652, 2666-67 (2013).

Vol. 9, No. 1

Northeastern University Law Review

83

under prong 1 — the personal standing created arguendo by the
monetary penalty — would presumably be unaffected by such policy
considerations. After all, a litigant with his or her own “particularized”
injury would seem, by definition, not to need the fiduciary or policy
obligations of a state. Accordingly, an objection based on a proponent’s
lack of fiduciary duty and attendant lack of policy constraints appears
to be inapposite to prong 1’s personal standing.
2. Lack of Concrete Injury
As discussed earlier,71 the injury in fact must be not only
particularized to the party claiming standing (which it is here), but
also concrete. A concrete injury may be “threatened” and still be
sufficient, but the injury cannot be “abstract.”72 In assessing how
“real” the “risk” of concrete injury must be, the Supreme Court
has looked to tort law, specifically the Restatement of Torts, for
principles governing what damages may and may not be recovered by
tort victims.73 In other words, whether damages are real enough for
purposes of Article III standing may relate to whether such damages
are recoverable under tort law.
Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the Restatement’s text
provides only the most general guidance here. For example, with
regard to the “certainty” of damages, a tort victim must “establish[]
by proof the . . . adequate compensation with as much certainty
as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.”74 The
Restatement’s comments are no more helpful. The victim must
prove damages “with reasonable certainty” but, with regard to future
harm, “[t]here is no mathematical formula that will determine the
chance of the harm occurring . . . .”75
While the $10,000 penalty incurred under Proposition 60
might appear on the surface to pose a real threat, Section 7’s actual
language creates uncertainty in at least three separate ways. First, if
the entire initiative were invalidated, then the proponent would not
be penalized, because the only basis for the penalty was a provision in
the now-defunct initiative. On the other hand, if — as contemplated
71
72
73
74
75

See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., id. at 1549; Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 (2004); Metro-N.
Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 439-41 (1997).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 (Am. L. Inst. 1979).
Id. at cmts. a & e.
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under Section 7 — a court invalidates only part of the initiative, it
is unclear whether the monetary penalty would survive the arguendo
invalidity of some or all of the rest of the initiative. To be sure,
Proposition 60’s Section 9 contains standard boilerplate that all of
the initiative’s provisions are severable.76 However, depending on
each initiative’s particular circumstances (including its language and
what parts are or are not valid), a court may disregard an initiative’s
severability language77 and strike down the entire initiative, including
its otherwise valid parts.78 The likelihood of the prospective penalty’s
survival, in turn, affects whether the penalty is sufficiently concrete
to support the proponent’s standing.
Severability, like damage certainty, is an inexact concept, not
capable of precise application.79 In general, federal courts look to
state law regarding initiatives’ severability.80 Under California law, a
severability clause such as Proposition 60’s Section 9, “[a]lthough
not conclusive,” provides some support for severability.81 Among the
criteria for severability, courts look to “volitional” severability, which
is whether an initiative’s remaining provisions (i.e., those provisions
not determined to be invalid) are “substantive” and “would likely
have been adopted by the people had they foreseen the invalidity
76
77

78

79

80
81

See Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 9.
See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. l.
rev. 235, 291 (1994) (noting that in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
Court treated severability clause under consideration as “raising only a
presumption of severability” (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932, 934)); David
H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 639, 652
(2008) (discussing discretion exercised by Supreme Court to treat statutes’
provisions as nonseverable).
See, e.g., Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 835-36 (Cal. 1966), aff ’d sub
nom. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding an initiative’s severability clause to be
“ineffective,” because the unconstitutional provisions were “fully integrated
and . . . not severable” (citation omitted)); Ex parte Blaney, 184 P.2d 892,
900-01 (Cal. 1947) (refusing to use authority under a statute’s severability
clause, because the statute failed “to differentiate” between protected and
unprotected speech).
See Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51
Harv. L. Rev. 76, 110-11 (1937) (“[T]he Court is free to decide each case
[involving severability] the way it pleases without having its discretion fettered
by any restraining doctrine.”); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 738, 749, 777 (2010) (describing severability doctrine as
“destructive and manipulable”).
E.g., Nat’l Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740, 748 n.12 (9th Cir. 1994).
Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1256 (Cal. 1989) (quoting
Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 315, 331 (1975);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 32 Cal.3d 180, 190 (1982)).
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of the [challenged provision] . . . .”82 It appears, therefore, that a
severable and otherwise valid non-substantive provision — such as
a monetary penalty on the proponent — might not survive if all of
the initiative’s substantive provisions are invalidated.83
A court’s determination of severability becomes more
difficult when severability bears on standing. Typically, a court
decides severability after trial, when rendering judgment on the
initiative’s validity. For example, initiative sections x and y are
adjudged to be invalid, but initiative section z is valid and is (or is
not) severable.84 However, this timing is disrupted when the court
must assess severability to determine standing, because standing
is a “threshold question”85 which is to be determined as early as
the pleading stage.86 A court, then, in order to determine whether
the penalty is “real” enough to constitute a sufficiently concrete
injury, would preliminarily assess the initiative’s likely validity
and the monetary penalty’s likely severability before trial.87 Thus,
82

83

84
85
86

87

See Calfarm Ins., 771 P.2d. at 1256 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 863 P.2d 694, 716 (Cal.
1994). See also League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 76667 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
While federal courts look to state law regarding severability, federal courts also
should avoid nullifying an entire statute in the absence of a clear legislative
intent to withdraw the valid portions of a statute if the challenged provision is
struck down. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 & n.15
(1985).
See, e.g., Calfarm Ins., 771 P.2d at 1255-56.
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973).
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1994).
See also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Where . . .
a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly . . . allege facts
demonstrating’ each element [of standing].” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 518 (1975))).
With specific regard to Proposition 60, its proponent could be confident
that some of Proposition 60’s substantive provisions would have survived
constitutional challenge. The same proponent previously proposed Measure
B, which was a similar adult-film initiative passed by Los Angeles County
voters in 2012. See sources cited supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Measure B had a condom requirement and other provisions which were
challenged by plaintiff adult film producers and actors on free speech and due
process grounds. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1132-34
(C.D. Cal. 2013). When plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the
condom requirement’s enforcement, the Ninth Circuit upheld the condom
requirement’s constitutionality (at least at the preliminary injunction stage).
Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2014). The same
condom requirement, in turn, was copied word for word into Proposition 60.
See Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 4. Accordingly, Proposition 60’s condom
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the severability of any of an initiative’s provisions depends on the
language and circumstances of that particular initiative. Whether
the proponent would be able to bear his or her burden of proving
standing based on a prospective monetary penalty will vary from
initiative to initiative.
Second, even if a monetary penalty survived because it is
severable from other provisions’ arguendo invalidity, Proposition 60’s
penalty would be imposed only after “all avenues for appealing and
overturning the court decision have been exhausted.”88 What does it
mean that all avenues for “overturning” — as distinguished from
“appealing” — the court decision have been exhausted? For example,
if a court invalidated an initiative in such a way that further legislation
could cure its (the initiative’s) defects, would the introduction
of such legislation mean that proponents have yet to exhaust “all
avenues,” thereby keeping any penalty in abeyance? Likewise, would
an additional initiative proposed to cure the invalidity keep a penalty
in abeyance? Without answers to such questions, a proponent might
be unable to bear his or her burden of proving that such a prospective
penalty is sufficiently real.
Third, a monetary penalty along the lines of Proposition 60’s
Section 7 might have been deemed a bill of attainder in violation
of the Constitution.89 Bills of attainder are “legislative acts, no
matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial.”90 Put another way, the
Constitution provides “a general safeguard against legislative exercise
of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by legislature.”91 The
specific argument here is that the monetary penalty does not apply to
all initiatives’ proponents; rather, it only imposes a $10,000 fine on

88
89
90
91

requirement would probably have survived a challenge, too. With one of
Proposition 60’s substantive provisions likely to have been valid, Proposition
60’s Section 7 fine would have been likely severable from any invalid provisions.
However, the severability issue discussed here is not limited to Proposition
60. In the future, other initiatives may lack the close precedent exemplified by
Measure B, so the survival of future initiatives’ substantive provisions — and
the resulting severability of a fine — would be an open question.
Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7 (emphasis added).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). See also Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867) (acknowledging that punishment
for purposes of bill of attainder can be civil as well as criminal sanction).
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this one individual proponent and, accordingly, is unconstitutional.
Once again, the fine’s uncertainty, this time based on concerns that it
is a bill of attainder, raises the question: Is the threatened injury — the
only basis for the proponent’s individual standing — adequately real?
In light of the above uncertainties, whether singly or in
combination, might the Supreme Court or other federal courts
nonetheless accept an initiative’s Proposition 60-type penalty as a
sufficiently concrete basis for a proponent’s individual standing? On
the one hand, a federal court would have to evaluate all of these
uncertainties at a lawsuit’s beginning — when a proponent first seeks
to appear — and Hollingsworth’s hostility to initiative proponents’
standing might auger that proponents have not met their burden.
On the other hand, proponents might argue that the Court’s citation
to tort damages suggests a low level of proof, because “[c]ourts
have traditionally required greater certainty in the proof of damages
for breach of a contract than in the proof of damages for a tort.”92
Oddsmakers might set the line here at “pick ‘em.”
3. The Bar Against Self-Inflicted Injury
The Supreme Court has long held that a party cannot base
a claim to standing on a self-inflicted injury.93 Accordingly, a party
objecting to an initiative proponent’s standing here could argue that
the proponent manufactured his own injury. The proponent himself
or herself drafted the threat of a monetary penalty and then further
gathered signatures, approved ballot arguments, and undertook
such other legal and political actions as were necessary to obtain
the initiative’s passage. The proponent might respond that the
voters who approved the initiative enacted the penalty and not the
proponent (who lacked power to enact anything). The proponent
92
93

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §352, cmt. a (Am. L. Inst.
1981).
For example, in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam),
various states, including Pennsylvania, complained about other states’ tax
policies, because those policies, in combination with the complaining states’
tax credits, reduced the complaining states’ tax revenues. The Court held
that Pennsylvania and the other complaining States lacked standing, because
“nothing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that [tax] credit . . . . No
State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.” Id.
at 664. See also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (finding
that parties’ “self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the [defendant]’s
purported activities” and therefore do not create standing).
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might add that, as a corollary, he or she cannot unilaterally undo —
and cannot avoid — the already-enacted penalty. To counter such
reasoning, a party objecting to the proponent’s standing might then
reply that, but for the proponent’s drafting and other pro-initiative
activities, no voter approval would have occurred and no penalty
would exist.
There does not appear to be direct precedent shedding light
on whether a self-inflicted-injury objection defeats an initiative
proponent’s standing. Still, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA94 is
instructive on the Court’s expansive conception of what qualifies as
a self-inflicted injury negating standing. There, the Court rejected
a facial challenge to a law95 that allowed the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence to authorize the surveillance of
noncitizens thought to be located outside the United States.96 Among
the plaintiffs were attorneys and human rights organizations asserting
that their work involved communications with probable targets of
surveillance under the law.97 They argued that risk of surveillance had
forced them to take “costly and burdensome measures” to keep their
communications confidential.98 In the Court’s eyes, however, the
plaintiffs sought to “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm
on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm.”99
It hardly seems likely that the plaintiffs in Clapper went to
the cost and trouble of shielding their communications from federal
surveillance simply to create the opportunity to gain access to court.
By contrast, Proposition 60’s proponent obviously inserted the
monetary penalty into the initiative for the very purpose of securing a
place in court. Applying Clapper’s approach, a court could well ignore
the technical niceties of who enacted the initiative and hold the
proponent responsible for bringing the harm on himself or herself.
Additionally, whatever the merits of competing arguments
over whether an initiative’s penalty provision creates Article III
standing, a broader consideration may prevent creation of standing
through this means. For over four decades, the Court has taken a
notably restrictive approach to standing.100 Rigorous enforcement of
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142-43.
Id. at 1145.
Id.at 1146.
Id. at 1151.
See, e.g., Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 11 (2004); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen
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standing requirements is rooted largely in the Court’s commitment to
observing the “properly limited . . . role of the courts in a democratic
society.”101 In light of this philosophy, it seems unlikely that the
Court would countenance devices to circumvent Hollingsworth by
empowering proponents to draft their own Article III injuries.
Perhaps the circumstances of Hollingsworth are sufficiently infrequent
that recognizing an injury constructed this way would not open
floodgates to federal litigation on initiatives. Still, it would encourage
an increase of the occasions on which federal courts assess initiatives
that runs counter to a central aim of modern standing doctrine.
Moreover, if accepted, the rationale for standing through this means
could open the door to mechanisms with potential to widen the range
of individuals with personal standing to defend initiatives.
B. Variations on Creation of Standing via a Penalty
Scholars Scott Kafker and David Russcol propose two
variations on Proposition 60’s penalty,102 both intended to create
prong 1’s personal standing.
1.

Variation 1: Bounty

Whether by general state law or as embedded in an initiative,
a successful defense of the initiative would entitle the defender to
a monetary bounty.103 While this bounty proposal might avoid the
uncertainty and self-inflicted injury concerns of the penalty discussed
above, we doubt whether such a bounty would pass Hollingsworth
muster. In principle, such a bounty lacks any limits on who could
claim standing. For example, an initiative could offer a bounty to
any persons — not just proponents — who successfully defend the
initiative. Indeed, a bounty could be attached to any law, whether
federal or state and whether traditional legislation or initiative,
thereby giving everyone prong 1 personal standing to defend an
initiative’s or other law’s validity.
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974).
101 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
102 See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 53, at 291-95. This variation is the obverse
of Proposition 60: In the latter, the proponent is penalized for failing to
successfully defend his or her initiative; in the former, the proponent is
rewarded for successfully defending his or her initiative.
103 See id. at 291-92.
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To be sure, as Kafker and Russcol have noted, a bounty may bear
some resemblance to a traditional qui tam action, which does confer
standing on the relator (akin to a plaintiff).104 However, an essential
element of a qui tam action is that the government and relator share in
a monetary recovery: The relator receives “a partial assignment of the
Government’s damages claim.”105 In other words, the government
and relator share in a monetary recovery,106 an element which the
bounty lacks. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, with its inhospitality
to initiative proponents’ standing, would be unlikely to countenance
bounty-based standing given its limitless applicability and its failure
to adhere to traditional qui tam requirements.
2. Variation 2: Refundable Filing Fee
Some states, as a matter of existing law, may require all
initiative proponents to pay a fee upon the filing of the initiative.107
Under Kafker and Russcol’s variation 2, this filing fee would be
wholly or partially refunded to the proponent upon a successful
defense of the initiative.108
An initiative’s refund provision, depending on its exact
wording, might or might not avoid Proposition 60’s uncertainty
problems. The refund would avoid Proposition 60’s self-inflicted
injury problem, because the original fee is required of any proponent
who files a proposed initiative. The refund also avoids the overbreadth
of variation 1, in that variation 2’s refund would be available only to
104 See id. Qui tam is a statutory creation, derived from old English law: Under
specified statutes and circumstances, a private party — who has suffered no
injury — may sue a wrongdoer to recover a penalty owed to the government,
with the recovery divided between the private party and the government. See,
e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
768-72 & nn.1&3 (2000).
105 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2013).
106 E.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1414 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
107 See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-21 (West 2017); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2224-302 (West 2016).
108 See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 53, at 292-95. Of course, this variation 2 would
be unavailable in those states which lack a filing fee for initiatives, because
nothing could be refunded. For example, California requires a $2,000 filing
fee, but the fee is refunded if the initiative “qualifies for the ballot within two
years . . . .” Cal. Elec. Code § 9001(c) (West 2016). Accordingly, no refund
would be available in California, because, by definition, the fee would have been
refunded before the enacted initiative’s validity is tested. Without the possibility
of a refund, in turn, variation 2 could not create standing in California.
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the proponents who paid the original fee, and the refund could not
be claimed by just any self-selected defender of the initiative. With
these defects avoided, initiative proponents could argue that the
refund gives them individual standing: a personal monetary stake
which is contingent upon the initiative’s validity.
On the other hand, a refund presents a logical tangle. More
particularly, this variation 2 might run afoul of the Supreme Court’s
hostility toward “manufacture[d] standing.”109 The proponent’s
original “injury in fact” is the filing fee.110 However, this injury is
“not fairly traceable to [the challenged law].”111 Indeed, the injury
and the refund are unconnected, save for the language in which the
proponent himself or herself inserted into the initiative.112
C. Representational Standing Through State Employment
As earlier discussed, Proposition 60’s Section 10 sought
to gain standing through the separate route of conferring prong
2’s representational status on the proponent in the event that the
Attorney General fails to defend the initiative.113 Such a provision
raises the question of whether an initiative can delegate the state’s
standing to a proponent by appointing him or her as a state official.
Here, the answer appears to be clearer than with regard to prong
1’s personal standing: “No.” Three independent reasons undermine
Section 10 and, more generally, other proposed prong 2 language.
First, Section 10 would likely run afoul of California’s
constitution, which bars a proposed initiative from naming “any
individual to hold any office”114 — perhaps a violation as well under
comparable provisions in the constitutions of other states authorizing
initiatives.115 Here, the proponent would become a state employee
109 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013).
110 Cf. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (requiring
evidence of the injury in fact).
111 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
112 It is true that the Court has recognized standing for a qui tam relator under
an assignor-assignee rationale. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000). Still, the circumstances there — where
the government enlisted private support to recover from a concrete monetary
injury that it has suffered — seem well removed from a scheme crafted for
the sole purpose of slipping the plaintiff into court rather than to redress a
monetary injury to the government. See id.
113 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
114 Cal. Const. art. II, § 12. See also discussion supra Part I-C.
115 See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. IV pt. 2, § 19, cl. 13; Colo. Const. art. V, §25, cl. 8
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if California’s Attorney General failed to defend Proposition 60. The
contingency of the proponent’s status raises the question of whether
such a conditional appointment violates the state constitution’s
prohibition. It seems a fair reading of the California Constitution’s
prohibition on naming an individual to office that it applies whether
the naming is conditional or unconditional. If this argument were to
prevail, the California Constitution would then subject the initiative
to a pre-election challenge to prevent its “submi[ssion] to the
electors.”116 Even if this California constitutional violation occurred
only when the Attorney General failed to defend the initiative —
that is, Proposition 60’s Section 10 condition precedent is met —
and the proponent’s appointment becomes unconditional, plaintiffs
could still successfully challenge the initiative.117 Proposition 60’s
Section 10, then, appears to have been an impermissible naming of
the proponent to office.
(barring as “[s]pecial legislation,” inter alia, laws “granting to any corporation,
association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or
franchise whatever”); N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 9, cl. 8 (same); Justin R. Long,
State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 719, 721
n.6 (2012) (collecting state constitutional prohibitions of “special” laws); see
generally Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as
Structural Restraints, 40 J. Legis. 39 (2013-2014) (examining the widespread
prohibitions on states’ abilities to enact “special laws,” including laws which
identify particular persons).
116 Cal. Const. art. II, § 12.
117 See id. While the California Constitution’s language is that no such initiative
“shall have any effect,” the California Supreme Court has ruled that an
initiative provision which impermissibly names an individual to office might
be severed, with the rest of the initiative remaining valid. See, e.g., Calfarm
Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1263, 1266 (Cal. 1989) (an initiative’s
identification of a “private corporation” to perform a “function” in violation of
California Constitution, art. II, § 12 may be severed, such that the remainder
of the initiative is valid). This severability option might not save a proposed
initiative which is challenged under Cal. Const. art. II, § 12 (and other
states’ similar provisions, see supra note 114) before the initiative is enacted
by voters. While no case law on this question appears to exist, an initiative’s
opponents could argue: (a) severability under Calfarm Ins. was in connection
with an already “enacted” initiative, 771 P.2d at 1249, (b) an initiative’s
severability language can have no legal effect if the initiative — including the
severability language — has not been enacted, and (c) the plain language of
Cal. Const. art. II, § 12 is that no initiative naming “any individual to hold
any office . . . may be submitted to the electors . . . , ” and this pre-election
remedy contains no provision for severability. In sum, language such as
Proposition 60’s Section 10 might doom an entire initiative notwithstanding
severability language — if the initiative is challenged before the election.
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Second, Proposition 60’s Section 10 appeared to conflict with
Proposition 60’s Section 7. Section 10 would have subjected the
proponent to “all fiduciary duties” prescribed by law, presumably
including all such duties imposed on state employees. However,
Section 7 posed the possibility of a $10,000 penalty on the proponent
if any part of the initiative was invalidated by a court.118 In some
instances, a state could benefit from conceding the invalidity of a
specific provision: for example, to delete a possibly unconstitutional
provision, so as to preserve the remainder of the initiative. Under
ordinary circumstances, a state employee might have a fiduciary
duty to so concede. However, the proponent would have a contrary
personal interest in conceding nothing — that is, defending every
single provision of the initiative — lest he or she personally be
penalized $10,000.
Third, under federal law, even if the proponent were technically
an agent of the state, he or she would not be a true public official
entitled as a matter of policy to assume the state’s standing. As set
forth in Hollingsworth, officials with standing on behalf of the state are
subject to the state’s “resource constraints, changes in public opinion,
or potential ramifications for other state priorities.”119 However, an
initiative proponent — even if a state employee — is subject to none
of these policy considerations. For example, Proposition 60’s Section
10 expressly provided that the state must reimburse the proponent’s
defense expenses, and Section 10 listed no exceptions, even in the
face of, say, severe state budgetary constraints.120
These policy considerations grow larger and more complex
if an initiative has more than one official proponent. For example,
as noted earlier, California’s Proposition 8 had five proponents.121
Depending on the initiative’s actual language, this multiplicity
of proponents could raise vexing issues. Could each of the five
proponents become a state employee? If so, would they have to
agree on a single counsel, or would each be entitled to appear and
engage different outside counsel to defend the initiative? If the
former, what if the proponents could not agree on a single attorney?
If the latter, the resulting expenses of multiple counsel could be
substantial and without a finite cap. In addition, what would happen
if the various proponents’ defenses conflicted? One proponent might
118
119
120
121

Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013).
Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 10.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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interpret a provision in the initiative in a way inconsistent with
another proponent’s interpretation. In a similar vein, one proponent
might concede the invalidity of a provision, but another proponent
might not. If an initiative had five (or more) official proponents,
such conflicts might be likely. Would a court be obligated to accept
all conflicting positions as representing the state? Thus, it seems
improbable that a federal court would accord proponents standing
to represent the state in defending initiatives, even if the proponent
formally becomes a state employee.122
III. Seeking to Avoid Hollingsworth: Allowing Participation in
Litigation Without the Need for Standing
Proposition 54, which will reform state legislative procedures
by, inter alia, requiring that bills are posted on the Internet at least
seventy-two hours before being passed, contains the following
Section 6.1:
Section 12511.7 is added to the Government Code123
to read:
....
If an action is brought challenging, in whole or
in part, the validity of [Proposition 54], the following
shall apply:
(a) The Legislature shall continue to
comply with [Proposition 54] unless it is declared
122 Apart from Proposition 60’s section 10 problems vis-à-vis standing, Section
10 is also vague — or even defective — with regard to the meaning of the
Attorney General’s failure to defend (which is the condition precedent to the
proponent’s appointment as a State employee with authority to defend the
initiative on the State’s behalf). What if the Attorney General appears to defend
the initiative, but concedes the invalidity of critical parts of the initiative? Or
the Attorney General appears, but his or her defense lacks “vigor”? See Perry
v. Brown, 265 P. 3d 1002, 1022 (Cal. 2011). See also Manheim et al., supra note
15, at 1085-86 & n.92 (opining that a defense lacking vigor may be worse than
no defense at all, because the former is subtler than the latter and might allow
the non-vigorous official to escape political accountability).
123 This new Section 12511.7 is added under California Government Code
Chapter 6 (titled, “Attorney General”), Article 2 (titled, “General Powers and
Duties”). Cal. Gov’t Code § 12511.7 (Deering 2016).
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unconstitutional pursuant to a final judgment of an
appellate court.
(b) Except as set forth in subdivision (c),
the Attorney General shall defend against any action
challenging, in whole or in part, the validity of
[Proposition 54] . . . .
(c) If the Attorney General declines to defend
the validity of [Proposition 54] . . . , the Attorney
General shall nonetheless file an appeal from, or seek
review of, any judgment of any court that determines
that [Proposition 54] is invalid, in whole or in part,
if necessary or appropriate to preserve the state’s
standing to defend [Proposition 54] in conformity
with the Attorney General’s constitutional duty to see
that the laws of the state are adequately enforced.124
The apparent theory of Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 is to
allow the proponents (though without standing under Hollingsworth)
to participate in federal litigation if Proposition 54 is challenged.125
124 Proposition 54, supra note 6, § 6.1. Proposition 54 additionally provides that
(i) its “official proponents . . . have an unconditional right to participate,
either as interveners [sic] or real parties in interest” in any action regarding
Proposition 54’s “validity or interpretation” and (ii) if the Governor and
Attorney General decline to defend Proposition 54, then the proponents are
“authorized to act on the state’s behalf in asserting the state’s interest in
the validity of [Proposition 54] . . . .” Id. § 6.1(d). In federal courts, both of
these additional provisions — i.e., giving the proponents a blanket right to
participate or the right to act on behalf of the state — are directly barred by
Hollingsworth. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (States cannot “simply . . .
issu[e] to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal
courthouse.”). See also supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
125 A federal court lawsuit over Proposition 54 appears entirely hypothetical, in
that Proposition 54 presents no federal issues. Rather, only matters of the
state’s constitution and statutes are at issue, and those issues would be
litigated in state court, where proponents always have standing as a matter of
state law. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Nor do we question . . . the
right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts,
where Article III does not apply.”); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016-20
(Cal. 2001). See also Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1121. However, because
future initiatives that do present federal issues may contain Section 6.1-type
provisions, Part III of this article will analyze whether such provisions would
generally allow proponents to participate in federal court.
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As long as the state appears as a party — even as an inactive party
refusing to file a brief — and as long as Proposition 54 is enforced
during the litigation’s pendency, an adverse proceeding may exist.
This adverse proceeding, in turn, would allow an initiative’s
proponents to defend the initiative, albeit as intervenors or amici
without the requisite standing to be an actual defendant.
This theory might have been inspired, in part, by the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Windsor v. United States,126 decided
on the same day as Hollingsworth. In Windsor, a surviving spouse of
a same-sex couple challenged a provision of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) that denied her certain tax benefits.127 The
United States Attorney General refused to defend the validity of the
DOMA provision, but (a) continued to enforce it by refusing to issue
a tax refund to the plaintiff surviving spouse and (b) filed a notice of
appeal — though not a brief — after the trial court and court of appeals
found it unconstitutional.128 At trial and on appeal, a congressional
entity, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”), intervened
and sought to defend the DOMA provision.129 The Supreme Court
expressly declined to decide whether BLAG had standing, but it held
that the case was justiciable because the United States continued
to enforce the DOMA provision and would suffer a real injury upon
refunding the tax payment to the plaintiff.130
Proposition 54 appears to track Windsor in that its Section
6.1 obligates the legislature to continue to adhere to Proposition
54’s procedural mandates until a judgment of its invalidity becomes
final and obligates the California Attorney General to file a notice
of appeal, even if he or she does not otherwise defend Proposition
54.131 Thus, in theory, Windsor-type justiciability is established,
thereby allowing the proponents to defend Proposition 54 in federal
court, even if they — like BLAG — might lack actual standing.
However, Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 raises substantial
questions under both federal and state law. First, under federal
law, it is unclear that initiative proponents are analogous to BLAG.
Initiative proponents are private citizens;132 by contrast, BLAG was
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2683-84.
Id. at 2684.
Id. at 2686, 2688.
See Proposition 54, supra note 6, § 6.1.
See Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(a) (“The initiative is the power of the electors to
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution . . .”).
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a governmental entity.133 Hollingsworth held this distinction to be allimportant: “We have never before upheld the standing of a private
party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state
officials have chosen not to. We decline to do so for the first time
here.”134 Even if the proponents could be treated as BLAG-type
intervenors, Section 6.1 does not require the Attorney General to file
an answer in the U.S. District Court. Without an answer, the District
Court must enter the defendant’s default.135 Proponents may appeal
a subsequent default judgment,136 but the record on appeal would
contain little on which to reverse a judgment of the initiative’s
invalidity.137 In other words, allowing a proponent to participate in
an appeal — via the Attorney General’s notice of appeal — might
be a hollow victory, unless the proponent was allowed to develop
evidence at trial on which an appeals court could hold the initiative
to be valid.
Presumably, proponents could cure this specific problem
by redrafting Section 6.1 to provide, in Government Code Section
12511.7(c), that “the Attorney General shall nonetheless file
an answer sufficient to prevent entry of a default”138 as well as a
133 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
134 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). On the other hand,
the Attorney General’s filing of a notice of appeal might allow an initiative’s
proponents to become amici and thereby assert via written briefs and oral
argument the initiative’s validity, despite the proponents’ lack of standing. See
Fed. R. App. P. 29. Even if proponents could not appear as amici, an Attorney
General’s failure to file a brief only means that the Attorney General “will
not be heard at oral argument unless the court grants permission.” Fed. R.
App. P. 31(c). The circuit court would still decide the appeal on the merits
and would not automatically decide against the party failing to file a brief. See
Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., 629 F.3d 876, 887 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010).
135 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
136 See, e.g., Calumet Lumber, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Indust., Inc., 103 F.3d 612, 614-15
(7th Cir. 1997).
137 See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).
138 Mandating this type of minimal, noncommittal answer is intended to
accommodate both of the following: (a) an elected attorney general’s right
to refuse to defend an initiative that the attorney general believes to be
unconstitutional, and (b) the litigation’s still proceeding on the merits —
i.e., without entry of a default — and the initiative’s proponents having an
opportunity to intervene. See, e.g., infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
For example, in litigation over Los Angeles County’s Measure B, the defendant
County officials did not plead that Measure B was constitutional, but did
answer that the plaintiffs’ complaint “presents important constitutional
questions that require and warrant judicial determination”; Measure B’s
proponents successfully intervened, and the litigation continued on the
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notice of appeal. Such a filing is critical in the Ninth Circuit, where
an initiative proponent might then be permitted to intervene as
a defendant, even if the proponent lacked standing on his or her
own. 139 Still, while this Section 6.1 may be a ticket to the federal
courthouse, it nonetheless poses a state law concern: California’s
Attorney General has a right not to defend a state law. This principle
was established in People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown.140
In Deukmejian, California’s Attorney General advised a state
agency regarding an underlying state court lawsuit filed against the
agency, alleging that the agency was attempting to implement an
unconstitutional statute.141 One week after advising the agency,
the Attorney General himself sued the agency, also seeking to have
the statute declared unconstitutional on the same grounds as the
underlying lawsuit.142 The California Supreme Court enjoined the
Attorney General from proceeding, holding that he could not sue
his own former client — the state agency — especially after he
advised the agency regarding the very law at issue.143 However, the
court also held that the Attorney General, who is an independently
elected constitutional officer, “cannot be compelled to represent
state officers or agencies if he believes them to be acting contrary to

139

140
141
142
143

merits. See Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 1, Vivid Entm’t
LLC v. Fielding, No. CV 13-00190 (AGI) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013), ECF no.
21; see also supra note 68 (citing Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1123-27 &
nn.281, 286 & 299-300); Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2013), aff ’d, 774 F.3d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 2014).
See State of Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 845-46 & n.9
(9th Cir. 2003). But see Appel, supra note 52, at 270 (not all circuits allow such
piggyback standing). Even in the Ninth Circuit, an intervenor on the defense
side might be limited to seeking the same relief sought by the defendants
with standing. Cf. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., ___ U.S. __, 2017
U.S. LEXIS 3555 at *2, *4 (Jun. 5, 2017) (“[A]n intervenor of right must
have Article III standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that
which is sought by a party with standing.”) (involving attempt by party to
intervene as a plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)). If the
defendants with standing and the intervening proponents seek only the same
relief — such as a judgment that the initiative is constitutional — then Town of
Chester’s limitation would be moot. On the other hand, if the defendants and
intervenors were to seek different relief — say, the defendants sought only
to validate parts of an initiative, while the intervening proponents sought to
validate the entire initiative — then Town of Chester might limit the intervenors
to the relief sought by defendants.
624 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Cal. 1981).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1210.
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law, and he may withdraw from his statutorily imposed duty to act
as their counsel . . . .”144 This right not to defend the state is based,
at least in part, on the Attorney General’s common law powers to
protect “the public interest,” which may conflict with the obligation
to represent state agencies or officials.145
Applying Deukmejian to Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 poses a
fundamental question: May an initiative force an Attorney General to
file an answer or a notice of appeal if the Attorney General believes
that the initiative is unconstitutional (so that an answer or appeal
would be contrary to “the public interest”)? Stated differently, would
a court mandate that an Attorney General answer or appeal when he or
she believes that no good-faith basis exists for the answer or appeal?
No definitive answer exists. Part of the difficulty here is that
Deukmejian’s discussion of the Attorney General’s powers cited to
both the State constitution and State statutes.146 Perhaps, then,
an initiative that included a constitutional amendment to require
the Attorney General to file an answer or notice of appeal would
effectively overrule Deukmejian, thus compelling filing of an answer
or notice of appeal despite the Attorney General’s beliefs about
the initiative.147 Proposition 54’s Section 6.1, however, specifically
amends a statute — namely, the Government Code — so it is
questionable whether it would override the California Supreme
Court’s ruling in Deukmejian.
144 Id. at 1209.
145 Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1207, 1209 (citing D’Amico v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
520 P.2d 10, 20 (1974)).
146 Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1209.
147 Proponents seeking to qualify such initiatives (which contain constitutional
mandates) for statewide ballots may face practical hurdles in states where
constitutional initiatives require more signatures than statutory ones. For
example, in California, initiatives amending the state’s constitution currently
require almost 220,000 more signatures than statutory initiatives. See Cal.
Const. art. II, § 8(b) (requiring signatures of eight percent of the total votes
cast in the most recent gubernatorial election for constitutional initiatives,
but only five percent for statutory initiatives); Statement of Vote, Cal. Sec’y of
State 6 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/
pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf (reporting that approximately 7.32 million
votes were cast in the most recent gubernatorial election). Accordingly,
a constitutional initiative — including one where the only constitutional
provision is the Attorney General’s obligation to file an answer or a notice
of appeal — might cost $1 million more than a purely statutory initiative for
signature gathering. See, e.g., Caragozian, supra note 26, at 695 & n.50 (noting
that signature gatherers charge $3 to $5 or more per signature).
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Conclusion
Considerable reason exists for skepticism toward the
capacity of Proposition 60’s Section 7 — which threatened to fine
an initiative’s proponent for a partially or wholly invalid initiative —
to create personal standing for the proponent. The prospect of a
$10,000 penalty is uncertain, and in addition, courts are likely to
deem the penalty self-inflicted. Moreover, there is reason to question
the validity of scholars’ bounty and refund variations: (1) a bounty
would appear to have no limits on who could have standing and also
departs substantially from the traditional qui tam structure; and (2)
a refundable filing fee would be available only in states that impose
and retain fees, and further, might be outside the logic of traditional
standing.148 Less ambiguity, however, attends Proposition 60’s Section
10, which purports to allow the proponent to represent the state and
assume the state’s standing. That provision appears to be invalid
under (a) the California Constitution’s bar on initiatives naming a
person to hold office; and (b) Article III in making Proposition 60’s
proponent a state employee in name only without Hollingsworth’s
substantive attributes such as responsiveness to limited resources
and changes in public opinion. Accordingly, initiative drafters in
California and other states authorizing initiatives should refrain
148 Until courts rule otherwise, of course, none of these approaches can be
categorically dismissed. Also, little disadvantage would appear to result from
including such provisions in future initiatives (except for the disadvantage
of the proponent perhaps being liable to pay the fine under provisions like
Proposition 60’s Section 7). Accordingly, absent definitive future case law to
the contrary, initiative drafters’ best practices might now include language —
adapted from Proposition 60 — similar to the following (along with the
Proposition 60’s Section 9 severability language):
The People of this State hereby declare that the proponent of this
[Initiative] shall be held civilly liable in the event this [Initiative]
is struck down, after passage, by a court for being constitutionally
or statutorily impermissible. Such an impermissible [Initiative] is a
misuse of taxpayer funds and electoral resources and the [Initiative]’s
proponent, as the drafter must be held accountable.
In the event this [Initiative], after passage, is struck down, in
whole or in part, as unconstitutional or statutorily invalid, and all
avenues for appealing the court decision have been exhausted, the
proponent shall pay a civil penalty of $10,000 to the State for failure
to draft a wholly constitutionally or statutorily permissible initiative.
No party of entity may waive this civil penalty.
See Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7. Comparable language could be crafted for
monetary rewards and refundable filing fees.
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from including such representational standing provisions.
Less reason for skepticism exists with regard to the gist of
Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 mandate that the Attorney General file
a notice of appeal. If, as set forth in Part III above, Section 6.1 is
revised in two important ways — (1) the mandate is added to the
state constitution, not to a statute; and (2) the Attorney General
is required to file an answer (even if just a pro forma one149), as
well as a notice of appeal — initiative proponents may participate
in federal litigation. More specifically, proponents in circuits that
allow piggyback standing, such as the Ninth Circuit, could intervene
as defendants at trial, and proponents in all circuits may be allowed
to brief and argue as amici on appeal, despite their lack of actual
standing. To be sure, such participation would be less robust than
that of full-fledged defendants and appellants, but Hollingsworth’s
standing restrictions may leave initiative proponents few alternatives.

149 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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